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This paper looks into the impact the accession of the Western Balkan countries of 
Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYROM would 
have  on  voting  power  in  the  EU  Council.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  the 
implications of a priori coalitions between member states. The Shapley-Shubik power 
index is used to estimate voting power and two scenarios are considered: accession 
under the Nice Treaty and the Reform Treaty rules. If the Western Balkans accede 
under  the  Nice  Treaty  rules  then  the  efficiency  and  workability  of  the  EU  would 
deteriorate, although the “paradox of new members” might occur where the power of 
some existing members is increased. Conversely if the accession took place under the 
Reform Treaty rules then there would be little impact on the ability of the EU to act. 
The inefficiency of a priori coalition formation between countries of dissimilar size is 
revealed,  as  well  as  the  likely  occurrence  of  the  “paradox  of  size”  where  some 
countries are made worse off through cooperation. The enlargement will not affect 
this. 
 
                                                 
* Corresponding author (email: em505@york.ac.uk) 
† This paper is based on the first chapter of my PhD thesis at the University of York. I am grateful to 
James Wright for the encouragement and support, and Alvaro Pereira for the useful comments. All 






Ever since the collapse of communism, and the end of the Balkan wars that 
followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the countries of the Western Balkans have 
contemplated the idea of joining the European Union (EU) and thus following in the 
steps of Slovenia, the first former Yugoslavian country to become an EU member in 
2004. Since then Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
have been awarded candidate country status, and Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are hoping to follow suit in the future. 
  Although  the  EU  recognises  the  Western  Balkan  countries  as  potential 
candidate  countries,  it  is  not  certain  when  or  whether  they  will  join.  The  most 
optimistic scenarios place EU accession around 2013-2015 (Gropas (2006)) given the 
progress made so far, whereas recently there have been voices in the Union calling for 
a  privileged  relationship  option  to  be  offered  instead.  Regardless  of  the  outcome, 
looking into the consequences that the enlargement to the Western Balkans would 
have on decision-making and the distribution of power between member states will 
provide a clear idea of what to expect. 
Decision-making  in  the  EU  rests  on  a  triangle  of  three  institutions:  the 
European  Parliament,  the  European  Commission,  and  the  Council  of  Ministers 
(subsequently referred to as the Council). The role of the European Commission is to 
look  after  the  interests  of  the  EU  as  a  whole  and  it  is  independent  of  national 
governments. It is politically accountable to the European Parliament, which has the 
authority to dismiss it by means of censure. One of the most important tasks of the 
European  Commission  is  drafting  proposals  for  new  legislation,  which  are 
subsequently presented to the European Parliament and the Council. The European 
Parliament is made up of members directly elected by EU citizens every five years to 
represent their interests and is structured according to political rather than national 
interests.  The  Council  makes  day-to-day  decisions  and  along  with  the  European 
Parliament  decides on EU legislation and the annual EU budget. It also promotes   3
economic and employment policy coordination, and makes limited decisions about 
common foreign and security policy. It consists of ministers of the governments of 
every  member  state  of  the  EU,  and  so  can  be  seen  as  a  cabinet  of  cabinets  that 
represents national interests. Therefore the distribution of power within the Council 
matters. The make up of the Council changes depending on the nature of the subject 
under discussion. For example, if decisions need to be made about farming, then the 
ministers of agriculture will form the Council. 
Given  the  importance  of  the  distribution  of  power  within  the  Council  this 
paper focuses exclusively on this institution. The aim of the paper is to measure the 
voting  power  of  each  EU  state  within  the  Council  under  the  assumption  that  the 
Western Balkan countries accede to the Union. Where power is used to mean the 
probability of a country being pivotal to the outcome of a given vote. A number of 
papers  in  the  past  have  applied  different  power  indices  to  political  bodies  and 
situations that can be described as weighted voting games. For example the Shapley-
Shubik Power Index (SSI) was used by Shapley and Shubik (1954) to model the US 
Congress, and subsequently by Kauppi and Widgren (2004) to explain EU budgeting, 
by Levinsky and Silarszky (1999) and Winkler (1998) to study the distribution of 
power  in  the  Council  after  the  accession  of  Eastern  European  countries,  and  by 
Algaba et al to examine the distribution of power in the Council under both the Nice 
and Constitutional Treaty rules. The Banzaf power index (Banzaf (1965)) has been 
used by Hosli (1995) to measure voting in the Council under the double majority 
rules, by Johnston (1995) to analyse the position of the United Kingdom (UK) on 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the EU shortly before the accession of Austria, 
Sweden and Finland, and by Algaba et al (2007) to analyse the distribution of voting 
power in the Council under both the Nice and Constitutional Treaty rules. Baldwin 
and Widgren (2005) used both the SSI and Banzaf indices to measure the impact of 
Turkey’s membership on EU voting. 
However due to the uncertainty of the integration of the Western Balkans into 
the EU little research has been carried out looking at possible issues that might arise, 
and none has as yet examined the impact on the existing members’ voting power, or 
the a priori coalitions that might be formed between them. This paper addresses this 
gap  by  examining  the  distribution  of  power  within  an  enlarged  Council,  paying 
particular attention to the cases where a priori unions are formed between the member   4
states. The SSI is used, as well as its modification introduced by Owen (1977) in the 
case where a priori unions are likely to arise. 
This paper reveals that if the accession of the Western Balkans takes place 
under the Nice Treaty rules the workability of the EU will be diminished, with a 
reduction  in  the  probability  of  passing  decisions.  The  voting  power  of  all  current 
member states will be reduced, although the “paradox of new members” might occur 
where the power of some existing members is increased. In contrast if the Western 
Balkans joined under the Reform Treaty rules there would be little impact on the 
efficiency of the EU and its ability to act. The voting power of existing member states 
is again reduced, with the small EU members suffering substantial losses in voting 
power. The inefficiency of a priori coalition formation between countries of dissimilar 
size is also revealed, along with the likely occurrence of the “paradox of size”, where 
some countries are made worse off through cooperation. This result is not affected by 
the enlargement.   
 The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes decision-making in the 
Council under the Nice and Reform Treaty rules and what the change of rules would 
mean for the EU states; section 3 explains the logic and mathematics of the SSI, its 
generalisation by Owen (1977), and why it was chosen over the equally known and 
used Banzhaf power index; section 4 describes the data, and presents and interprets 
the  results  obtained  both  with  and  without  the  assumption  of  a  priori  coalitions 
between the EU members; and finally section 5 concludes. 
 
 2. Decision-Making in the EU Council of Ministers 
 
Until  November  2004  the  Council  made  decisions  based  mostly  on  QMV. 
This system allocated weighted votes
1 to all the member states and the threshold for a 
proposal to pass was 71% of votes. In the EU15 the total number of votes was 87
2, 
and after the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 all EU15 members maintained the 
same  number  of  votes,  while  the  votes given to the new members were a simple 
interpolation  of  the  EU15  votes  as  specified  in  the  accession  Treaty.  This  QMV 
                                                 
1 The number of votes depended mostly on the size of countries. 
2  Germany,  Italy,  the  UK  and  France  had  10  votes  each,  Spain  8  votes,  Belgium,  Greece,  the 
Netherlands  and  Portugal  5  votes  each,  Austria  and  Sweden  4  votes  each,  Denmark,  Ireland  and 
Finland 3 votes each, Luxembourg 2 votes.    5
system  favoured  small  countries,  and  as  the  2004  and  previous  enlargements 
welcomed mostly small nations, there was a shift of power from bigger to smaller 
countries, and thus uneven representation of EU citizens, which put the democratic 
character and legitimacy of decisions taken in danger. Therefore reform was deemed 
necessary. 
After extensive debate and bargaining a compromise was finally reached at the 
Nice Summit (See Moberg (2002) for details), the rules of which came into force in 
November 2004 and are supposed to continue to govern the EU for five years. The 
Nice Treaty brought three major changes. To begin with, the votes of every country 
were weighted anew as depicted in table1
3.  
 
Table 1: The new weighted votes allocation in the EU Council for the EU27 
 
              Source: Bobay(2001) 
 
                                                 
3 Table 1 taken from Bobay (2001)   6
Spain and Poland were the big winners as their voting power share grew by 
1.8% in the EU25 (known as the “Aznar Bonus”
4) (Baldwin et al (2004)), following 
Spain’s demand to obtain blocking power in the enlarged EU (Bobay (2001)). The big 
countries made moderate gains of 0.9% in the EU25, and small/medium countries lost 
power (Baldwin et al (2004)). Secondly the Qualified Majority Threshold (QMT) was 
increased  to  72.2%
5  of  Council  votes.  Finally  two  more  criteria  were  added:  the 
number of yes votes has to be 50% and at least 62% of the EU population has to be 
represented. The population criterion was added to accommodate Germany’s demand 
to break the equality parity it had with the other three big nations, namely the UK, 
France, and Italy
6 (Bobay (2001)). 
There has been extensive debate about the Nice Treaty rules – for example 
Baldwin et al (2004) argue that the new rules are a mistake that needs to be corrected 
because they lower the ability of the EU to make efficient decisions, the possibility of 
which is also stated by Tsebelis et al (2002), Tiilikainen et al (2002), and Bobay 
(2001). On the other hand other researchers, including Moberg (2002), dismiss the 
above  and  claim  the  population  criterion  is  only  useful for coalitions that include 
Germany,  and  that  the  majority  of  states  criterion  will  never  have  to  come  into 
practice. In any case the five years the Nice Treaty rules will be in force are critical, 
because they will determine how well the enlarged EU can operate, and any failure 
will undoubtedly strengthen eurosceptics.  
  From November 2014 the Nice Treaty rules will be abandoned and the rules of 
the Reform Treaty are supposed to come into force. These new rules will be applied 
gradually during 2014-2017, but in this period a member state can still ask for the 
Nice Treaty rules to be applied if it wishes
7. Weighted voting will be replaced by 
double majority, so a proposal will need to represent 55% of EU member states and 
65% of the EU population to pass. The member state threshold was introduced in 
order to convince small countries to accept the power gap between themselves and 
bigger states, and the population threshold to reconcile Spanish and Polish wishes to 
maintain the power gained at Nice, and French fears of small states blocking decision 
making.  In  addition,  any  blocking  coalition  must  have  at  least  four  members  –  a 
                                                 
4 After Jose Maria Aznar, prime minister of Spain at the time of negotiations. 
5 Actually QMT was set at 74% at Nice in an attempt to reverse Spain and Poland’s power gain, but 
later it was decided that this was not efficient and was lowered to 72.2%. 
6 Note that this is against the rules for equality between the large states in the EU. 
7 EurActiv 2007   7
measure intended to prevent a coalition consisting of France, Germany and Belgium, 
in other words the “old Europe” (Devuyst (2004)). Furthermore, if a number of states 
“somewhat” less than a blocking minority is opposed to the adoption of a rule, then 
the  Council  should  try  and  find  a satisfactory way to address the concerns of the 
disagreeing group at a reasonable time and without prejudicing the obligatory time 
limits. This is in fact a renewal of the Ioannina Commitment
8 and until March 31
st 
2017 “somewhat” will be defined as either 75% of the population level, or 75% of the 
number  of  states  required  to  form  a  blocking  minority.  From  April  1
st  2017 
“somewhat” will be defined as 55% of the population level, or 55% of the number of 
states  required  to  form  a  blocking  minority  (Presidency  Conclusions  2007). 
Unanimity  will  still  be  the  rule  for  more  sensitive  issues  such  as  taxation,  social 
security, foreign policy and defence. 
  As with the Nice Treaty, the big countries, especially Germany, will benefit 
from a shift of power towards them, this time at the expense of Spain and Poland (a 
total  reverse  of  the  “Aznar  Bonus”)  known  as  the  “Zapatero  Compromise”
9,  and 
medium countries with populations of around 10 million. It is estimated that Germany 
will have approximately one third more power than France, which will put an end to 
the equality of the Franco-German axis by making France the junior member of the 
partnership (See Balwin et al (2004)).  
  The  rules  of  the  Reform  Treaty  are  in  fact  the  same  as  the  rules  of  the 
Constitutional Treaty which was rejected by both the French and the Dutch in national 
referenda held in 2005. After two years of uncertainty and a lot of bargaining EU 
leaders managed to reach a compromise and keep the decision making rules of the 
Constitutional  Treaty  almost  intact.  Therefore,  just  like  the  Constitutional  Treaty 
rules,  the  rules  of  the  Reform  Treaty  are  expected  to  restore  the  workability  and 
efficiency of the EU. 
 
3. The Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI) 
 
Voting power indices are a useful tool because they can be seen as a statistical 
measure  that  summarizes  specific  properties  of  voting  games,  and  can  therefore 
                                                 
8  Made  in  1994  during  the  discussions  regarding  the  institutional  characteristics  of  the  EU’s 
enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
 
9 After Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, prime minister of Spain at the time of negotiations.   8
supplement  any  voting  theory  and  especially  cooperative  game  theory  and  its 
applications  to  modeling  political  institutions  (List  (2003)).The  most  widely  used 
indices of power are the SSI and the Banzhaf index.  
The SSI has its basis in cooperative game theory and the idea that each player 
has power when a change in their vote changes the outcome of the game. It measures 
power in an abstract sense, assuming that different players have different intensities to 
accept or reject a bill. To understand this assume that a number of individuals are 
about to vote on an issue. They vote in order and as soon as a majority has been 
reached the issue is declared passed and the person to vote last is given credit for 
having passed it. Now choose the order of people who vote at random. The frequency 
with which a person is part of the group whose votes are used can be calculated, as 
well as the number of times a certain individual is pivotal. This number of times gives 
the value of the index. As Shapley and Shubik (1954) put it “…[the index] measures 
the number of times that the action of the individual actually changes the state of 
affairs”. 
John Banzhaf rejected the SSI in 1965 arguing that the order in which players 
become  part  of  a  coalition
10  should  not  be  a  crucial  matter.  The  Banzhaf  index 
assumes that all players are independent, equally likely to form a coalition and equally 
likely to vote for or against a bill. The index measures the ability of a player to turn a 
losing coalition into a winning coalition, and is obtained by counting the number of 
times a player is likely to break a winning coalition, and then dividing that by the total 
amount of times that all players are likely to break a winning coalition in order to 
obtain a relative measure. In the words of Banzhaf (1965) “…the ratio of power of 
legislator X to the power of legislator Y is the same as the ratio of the number of 
possible  voting  combinations  of  the  entire  legislature  in  which  X  can  alter  the 
outcome by changing his vote to the number of combinations in which Y can alter the 
outcome by changing his vote”.  
Although most of the time the differences between the results obtained using 
the SSI and the Banzhaf index are marginal, there can be cases where they differ to a 
considerable  extent,  for  instance  when  they  are  applied  to  double  majority  voting 
                                                 
10 Note that the way the term “coalition” is used in this section does not mean and should not be 
confused with the term “a priori unions” or “a priori coalitions”. It is used to refer to the number of 
players supporting the bill.   9
systems (Paterson (2007))
11. This paper considers such a system and therefore the 
question of which index should be applied arises.  
Winkler (1998), Baldwin et al (2005), and Paterson (2007) suggest that the 
SSI  is  a  better  measure  when  communication  and  coalition  formation  is  likely 
between the players, which is very often the case in EU voting, whereas the Banzhaf 
index is more suitable when there is no coalition building and just the final votes are 
observed (Straffin (1988)). In addition the SSI is the only one of the indices used to 
measure  power  that  satisfies  the  set  of  postulates  introduced  by  Felsenthal  and 
Machover (1995), and has strong explanatory power as demonstrated, for example, by 
Levinsky and Silarszky (1998). Given this the SSI is chosen for the purposes of the 
paper. 
 Nonetheless it must be borne in mind that criticisms of the SSI have been 
made. One of the most common, as put forward for instance by Tsebelis and Garrett 
(1996 and 1999), is the fact that the index focuses on the payoffs of the players rather 
than analysing the game itself and the preferences of the players. Nevertheless, as 
voters in the Council change and the issues that decisions need to made on in the 
future are unknown, it is impossible to know the structure of the game and the true 
preferences of the players a priori. Thus the probabilistic approach of the SSI is very 
valuable and provides a good idea of the potential of every EU state to influence 
outcomes. In addition, whenever there is a possibility of players cooperating more 
closely, the SSI can be modified to allow for that, as demonstrated by Owen (1977). 
 
3.1 A mathematical explanation of the SSI
12 
 
Suppose that U denotes the universe of all players, and g is a superadditive set-
function from U to the real numbers i.e. g :U→Â. Let g denote a cooperative game 




*) for every C
* Í C Í U  
                                                 
11 See the Appendix II for indicative numerical examples between the two indices  
12  It  is  not  the  paper’s  purpose  to  give  a  detailed  mathematical  explanation  of  the  index  or  its 
modification  as  this  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  Therefore  throughout  this  section  the 
methodology and simplifications made by Levinsky and Silarszky (1999) will be followed because 
they  make  the  mathematical  understanding  of  the  index  easier.  See  Shapley  (1953)  for  a  full 
mathematical explanation.   10
where C
* and C are coalitions (sets) of players within U. Let G denote the space of all 
games, and G
n the space of n-person games within G i.e. G
n Í G. If there exists 
coalition C such that g(C)¹0 then the game u is non-zero.  
  Suppose also that gÎG and f:G
n→Â
n
+0 defined for every n, is the value of the 
game. A coalition N is called carrier of the game g when for every C, g(C) = g(CÇN), 
i.e. N contains the coalition C.   
Shapley (1953) introduced the value F : 
Fi (g)= {} )] ( ) ( [
!
)! 1 ( !
c g i c g
n
c n c
N C i - È
- - ∑ Ì Ï     (1) 
where n is the number of elements in the carrier N Ì U, c is the number of elements in 
the coalition C, and i is the player for which the value is being calculated. 
  The game g is a simple game if g(C)Î{0,1} for every C. Suppose that Gs is the 
space of all simple games, and Gs
n Ì G
n is the space of all simple n-person games. 
Player  i  belonging  to  coalition  C  is  pivotal  when  g(C)=1  and  g(C/{i})=0.  When 
g(C)=1 then C is a winning coalition, whereas when g(C)=0, C is a losing coalition. If 
and only if g(U/C)=0 then the coalition C is a blocking coalition.  
  When dealing with weighted games one should also consider the following: 
g(C)=1Û  q
C i i ³ ∑ Î b  
where βi is the weight of player i and q is the quota. The game index is the function f 
for  which  f: Gs
n →Â
n
+0  for every nÎÀ. Every value f of the game generates an 
individual index , the SSI. The SSI is given by (1).  
  A simplified way of understanding (1) is by thinking of  )] ( }) { ( [ c g i c g - È  as 
the fair compensation given to player i so as to remain in the coalition, and then 
averaging this over all possible permutations in which the coalition can be built. 
 
3.1.2 SSI with a priori unions 
   
  If one allows for some players in a game to cooperate more closely with each 
other than with the rest, then the idea of a priori unions introduced by Owen (1977) 
can be applied as follows: 
  Suppose  that    Y={L1,….Lm}  is  a  partition  of  the  carrier  N  to  an  a  priori 
coalition structure, that is a set of alliances who have agreed beforehand to cooperate 
in  the  game  v.  The  game  (g,P)  where  P={1,…m}  denotes  the  set  of  unions,  and   11
g(C)=v(ÈjÎsLj), for every CÌP, can be used to calculate total power Fj for union Lj. 
Assume that the union does not lose the power it could acquire. Then the sum of 
individual indices in every union equals the total power of that union : 
) ( ] ; [
1 g Y j L i i
j F = F ∑ Î n                                    (2) 
Now consider a subgame xj  among the players of the union Lj. This mirrors 
the  potential  of  different  sub-unions  when  players  defect  from  Lj  and  will  help 
compute the distribution of power in Lj  Assume that Q is a sub-union of Lj. So then, 
the characteristic function of game xj can be defined as the power indices of sub-
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and xj(Q)=Fj[gLj|Q]. In the game with a priori unions the value for individual players 
can be computed as a value in xj (Owen (1977)). Therefore, Fi
1[v;Y]= Fi[xj]. In order 
to get the formula for Fi
1[v;Y] observe that for iÎLj : 
Fi[xj]= [ ] ) ( }) { (
!
)! 1 ( !
,
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Note that xj(Q)=Fj[gLj|Q] and : 
xj(Q)= [ ] ) ( }) { (
!
)! 1 ( !
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m
c m s
Q L Q L
C j P C
j j - È
- - ∑
Ï Ì
                                          (5) 
xj(QÈ{i})= [ ] ) ( }) { (
!
)! 1 ( !
} { | } { |
,
C g j C g
m
c m s
i Q L i Q L
C j P C
j j È È
Ï Ì
- È
- - ∑                          (6) 
   
Let W= ÈaÎCLa.  Deducting (6) from (5) and considering (3) one can see that for jÏC 
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Substitute (7) and the equation derived from deducting (6) from (5) into (4): 
Fi
1[v;Y]= [ ] ) ( }) { (
! !
)! 1 ( ! )! 1 ( !
, ,
Q W v i Q W v
m l
c m c q l q
Q i L Q j
j
C j P C j
È - È È
- - - -
∑ ∑
Ï Ì Ï Ì
 (8)   12
where c, q, and lj are the cardinalities of the sets C, Q, and Lj respectively. Equation 
(8) provides the power index of every individual player participating in a game with a 
priori unions.  
An intuitive way of understanding the process described above is by thinking 
of the game as a two step process. First every union Lj selects one of its members, 
which carries all the weight of the union, to act as a representative when bargaining 
with other unions. At this point the total power of the union is evaluated. In the next 
and final step the total power of the union is decomposed among the members of the 
union. The power share of every individual member reflects the power they can get 
when forming sub-unions within Lj or defecting to form coalitions with other unions 
Li, where i≠j. 
 
4. Data and results 
 
  The rules of the Nice Treaty are supposed to be abandoned in November 2009 
with the rules of the Reform Treaty coming into force thereafter. However at present 
it is not known under what rules the Western Balkan countries will join the EU if they 
do so. Therefore, the impact the accession of the Western Balkans would have on the 
distribution of power within the Council will be examined under both the Nice and 
Reform Treaty decision rules. 
  It is well known that within the EU some states cooperate more closely with 
each other than with the rest. This activity is accepted by all members of the Union 
although it might not always be liked. De Schoutheete (1990) analysed the concept of 
subsystems within the EU of 12. A subsystem is a collection of states who feel they 
are destined to play a leading role, or wish to press forward with issues the rest are 
either not willing or ready to deal with, or wish to maintain certain privileges acquired 
before the subsystem was formed. This special relationship among states, has to be 
durable, formalised if possible in the form of a Treaty or agreement, effective, and not 
rejected by others. De Schoutheete (1990) found that at the time two subsystems were 
in existence in the EU, that of France and Germany, and that of the Benelux countries, 
Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands.  An  example  of  the  existence  of  the 
Franco-German  subsystem  is  a  proposal  drafted  by  the  two  countries  on  political 
cooperation  which  was submitted to the European Council of Milan in 1985, and 
which influenced the negotiations that were related to that part of the Single Act (De   13
Schoutheete (1990)). With respect to the Benelux subsystem De Schoutheete (1990) 
noted  that  before  every  European  Council  the  heads  of  states  of  Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands meet in order to discuss their views, and coordinate 
their actions. Considering the sub-system criteria, Stålvant (1990) concluded that the 
Scandinavian countries can also be considered as a subsystem.  
Since  1990  its  is  possible  that  more  subsystems  or  functioning  coalitions 
between countries have evolved. Those most frequently mentioned in the literature 
are: the Mediterranean countries Greece, Portugal, Spain, joined often by Italy and 
after  the  2004  enlargement  by  Malta  and  Cyprus  (for  example  see  Levinsky  and 
Silarszky  (1999),  and  Wallace  (1990));  and  the  Central  and  Eastern  European 
Countries  (CEECS)  (for  example  see  Levinsky  and  Silarszky  (1999)  and  Winkler 
(1998)). This paper will consider these coalitions. Additionally it will be assumed that 
if the Western Balkans join the EU they will join the a priori coalition of the CEECS. 
This is because these countries would be expected to have similar preferences due, for 
example, to their common heritage, experience of the transition process and relatively 
homogenous economies. 
 
4.1. Nice Treaty 
 
  As decision-making under the Treaty of Nice allocates member states weights 
depending largely on their population, this paper uses the same method to determine 
the weights of the Western Balkan countries. Consequently Serbia with a population 
of approximately 7.5 million is allocated 10 votes, the same as Bulgaria and Sweden 
who have populations of 7.5 and 9 million respectively. Croatia is allocated 7 votes, 
having a population of 4.4 million which is smaller than that of Finland (5 million) 
but  bigger  than  that  of  Ireland  (4  million)  who  have  7  votes  each.  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  is  also  assigned  7  votes  as  it  has  the  same  population  as  Ireland. 
Moreover Albania with a population of 3.2 million is given 7 votes because it is larger 
by 1.2 million than Latvia who leads the group of countries with 4 votes and this 
allocation appears to be fairer. Finally, FYROM and Montenegro are given 4 votes 
each as they have similar populations to Latvia and Luxembourg.   14
All calculations are performed using the program Indices of Power (IOP)
13 
because it allows the calculation of the index in cases where the players have multiple 
weights, as in the Treaty of Nice rules, and reports the number of winning coalitions 
between  the players, as well as Coleman’s decision probability, which depicts the 
ability of the EU to act. Two cases are identified, that of the EU27, and the EU33. The 
results are presented in table 2
14. Column three refers to the index before the Western 
Balkan  enlargement,  and  column  five  refers  to  the  index  after  the  enlargement. 
Column four refers to the voting power gap between every member and Malta -the 
country with the least voting power- before the enlargement, and column six to the 
voting  power  gap  after  the  enlargement  has  taken  place.  Finally,  the  decision 
probability, and the number of winning coalitions are reported. 
 
[insert table 2 here] 
 
The first thing one notices is the jump in winning coalitions from 3,957,782 in the EU 
of 27 members to 166,296,254  in the EU of 33. The addition of six members expands 
the number of possible winning coalitions by 42 times. The results also reveal the 
unworkability of the EU under the Nice Treaty rules, and the further deterioration of 
viability in the EU33 as expected. The decision probability, which depicts the EU’s 
capacity to act, declines in the EU33 to 1.94% from 2.95% in the EU27. This supports 
the  claims  of  politicians  who  call  for  no  further  enlargement  of  the  EU  after  the 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria, until the matter of decision-making to follow the 
Nice Treaty rules is resolved. 
  The enlargement will bring a reduction in the power of every EU country. Of 
the big four Germany will lose the least in relative terms, 8.66%, and Italy the most at 
9.4%.  Of  all  the  member  states  Poland  will  witness  the  biggest  loss  at  10.27%, 
followed by Cyprus 10.15%, Luxembourg 10.13% and Latvia, Slovenia, Spain, and 
Estonia who will lose around 10.1% each. Germany again loses the least overall, and 
remains the country with the most voting power. The above are clearly depicted in 
Figure 1. The average power loss will be 9.82%. Moreover, the gap between France, 
                                                 
13  Thomas  Bräuninger  and  Thomas  König  (2005)  Indices  of  Power  IOP  2.0  [computer  program] 
Konstanz:  University  of  Konstanz  [http://www.tbraeuninger.de/IOP.html].  IOP  will  be  used  for  all 
calculations in the paper. Permission has been granted by the creators.  
14 The statistical form 100SSI instead of SSI has been used in all the tables, as that makes them easier 
to read. All tables and figures can be found in Appendix I   15
the second most powerful nation in terms of voting power, and Germany will grow by 
52.48%, although in absolute terms it will grow by just 0.0477 percentage points. The 
gap between Germany and Malta, which is the least powerful nation will increase 
from  997%  to  1015%,  the  largest  rise  observed.  Paradoxically  though,  the 
enlargement will close the power gap between Poland and Malta from 891% to 889%. 
Overall the four big countries will lose the least of their voting power in percentage 
terms. 
 
[insert figure 1 here] 
 
Now  assume  that  a  priori  unions  are  formed
15  and  no  counter-unions  take 
place. The situation for the EU27 is summarized in table 3. The third column presents 
the  SSI  for  every  member  if  no  coalitions  are  formed
16.  The  remaining  columns 
assume the following: column four assumes a union between France and Germany; 
column five assumes cooperation between the Mediterranean countries and Italy; as 
Italy does not always find itself in agreement with the Mediterranean countries this 
case is considered separately in column seven; column six assumes an a priori union 
between  the  CEECs;  column  eight  assumes  a  coalition  between  the  Scandinavian 
countries; column nine assumes cooperation between the Benelux countries; and the 
last column presents the case where all coalitions are formed. Finally, next to every 
index the loss of voting power caused by the respective a priori coalition is reported 
for every state. 
 
[insert table 3 here] 
 
A coalition between France and Germany brings gains for both countries, 15% 
and 13.4% respectively, making them the most powerful nations in the EU. This a 
priori  union  seems  to  have  little  effect  on  the  voting  power  of  big  and  near  big 
countries -the UK and Italy witness the smallest power decline in the EU, 0.52% and 
0.19% respectively-, whereas it seems to affect mostly medium and small member 
states, especially Malta by 6.17%, and Cyprus by 6.08%. Although the ability of the 
                                                 
15 Equation (2) implies that the weight of a union can be obtained by regarding the whole union as a 
player with weight equal to the sum of the weights of the players that form it. This will be used many 
times throughout the paper. 
16 The same as ‘Power index before’ in table 2   16
EU to act almost doubles from 2.95% to 4.59%, it still is relatively low comparing to 
the  effect  on  Coleman’s  decision  probability  by  other  a  priori  unions  such  as  the 
Mediterranean and the CEECs coalitions. 
A similar situation is depicted in the next column where the Mediterranean 
countries and Italy cooperate. All these countries benefit greatly, particularly Malta by 
34.27%, and Cyprus by 33.84%, followed by Greece and Portugal, at 29.4% each, 
Spain by 21.59% and Italy by 20.44%. Note that as part of the coalition both Italy and 
Spain individually have more power (approximately 2.6 and 1.8 percentage points 
respectively)  than  France,  Germany  and  the  UK,  making  them  the  most  powerful 
countries in the Union. Similarly Greece and Portugal each have more power than 
Romania and Netherlands, who have more votes and bigger populations, and in the 
same fashion tiny Malta has more power than any of Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, 
and Estonia. Any other country that doesn’t belong to the coalition loses power. The 
biggest losses (over 10%) are recorded for Germany, France, the UK and Poland, and 
the smallest for Bulgaria at 3%. Comparing the above with column seven, the case 
where Italy does not cooperate with the Mediterranean countries, it becomes clear that 
Italy  is  better  off  aligning  itself  with  the  Mediterranean  coalition  –  by  almost  2 
percentage points. Still, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta, and Spain make gains, and 
the latter country obtains big country status although it has less votes than the big 
countries. As expected the rest of the countries record small losses.  
  Now assume that the CEECS form a coalition. This will make Poland the most 
powerful country in the EU gaining 2.7 percentage points or approximately 33.66%. 
Thus it can be inferred that Poland is the most benefited. The smallest countries of the 
coalition Estonia, Slovenia and Latvia reap the greatest gains, 45.82 % each. The rest 
gain over 40% in relative terms. All other EU members witness losses, especially 
Cyprus  by  25.44%,  and  Luxembourg  by  25.33%,  and  the  rest  between  11.64% 
(Germany) and 22.28% (Greece). Notice that Coleman’s decision probability soars to 
over 12%. It is no surprise that this coalition is the most powerful both individually, in 
terms of the gains made in relative forms by its members, and collectively, as it has 
the most votes, 101 in total and so is closer to forming a blocking coalition. 
  Next, consider a union between the Scandinavian countries. All three members 
make  gains  between  3.8%  and  5%, whereas most of the rest of the EU members 
record small loses. This union has very little impact on power, although a paradox is 
observed in the cases of Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Latvia, Slovenia, and   17
Estonia. These countries do not belong to the Scandinavian coalition and yet benefit 
from it, although given the small scale of benefit this result is interesting only from a 
theoretic  point  of  view.  It  is  observed  again  with  Germany  and  Malta  when  the 
coalition  between  the  Benelux  countries  is  formed.  The  latter  benefits  mostly 
Luxembourg, whose power grows by 9.41%, and has very small impact overall. 
Finally, the last column assumes the creation of all the above coalitions. The 
decision probability obtains its greatest value at 16.4%. Austria, which doesn’t belong 
to any coalition, almost doubles its power, making a profit of 45.3%. The members of 
the CEEC coalition benefit the most, between 47.7% for Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and 
35.4% for Poland, the most powerful nation in the EU. Cyprus and Malta also make 
small gains of 1.9% and 2.2% respectively. The remaining countries lose. Ireland in 
particular  records  losses  of  63%,  the  biggest  in  the  EU,  followed  by  Sweden  at 
39.46%,  the  Netherlands  at  38%,  and  the  rest  of  the  Scandinavian  and  Benelux 
countries. Greece and Portugal lose the least, about 1.4% each. An interesting fact in 
this case is that it deprives both France and Germany of their big country status, as 
Poland and Spain, who have less votes, have more voting power.  Overall table 3 
reveals the domination of the CEEC coalition under the Nice Treaty decision-making 
rules. 
   
 
[insert table 4 here] 
 
Table  4  summarizes  the  results  obtained  for  the  EU  assuming  that  the 
enlargement to the Western Balkans has taken place under the Nice Treaty rules
17. A 
coalition between France and Germany will benefit both countries by 16% and 14% 
respectively, making them the most powerful members. Again one can observe the 
paradox where countries outside a coalition profit from it, as the UK and Italy record 
small gains of 1.6% and 2% respectively. The rest of the countries witness moderate 
losses, ranging from 6.4% for Malta, to 1.1% for Spain. However, the accession of the 
Western  Balkans  has  brought  about  a  7.9%  loss  of power for the Franco-German 
coalition, from 20.18%  to 18.57%. 
                                                 
17 So the index in column three is the same as index in column five from table 2. Also, whenever 
reference is made to the impact of the enlargement while explaining the results of tables, it will always 
be in comparison to the table presenting the same coalition before the enlargement took place. 
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Assume now that Italy and the Mediterranean countries cooperate. Column 
five reveals gains for all members of the coalition, especially for Malta, at 30.3%, and 
Cyprus,  at  30%.  Spain  and  Italy  become  the  most  powerful  countries  in  the  EU, 
having almost 2 percentage points more power than Germany, the UK, and France, 
who lose the most: 8.7%, 7.5% and 7.5% respectively. Poland and the Netherlands 
follow with 6.3% and 5.9% respectively. Of all countries Romania’s power declines 
the least at 4.23%. The accession of the Western Balkans has reduced the power of the 
coalition  from  31.58%  to  27.56%,  which  accounts  for  approximately  12.71%. 
Comparing the above to column eight where Italy acts on its own, the countries of the 
coalition continue to make gains, although these are smaller not having Italy by their 
side, while Italy loses the chance to become the most powerful nation in the Union. 
Clearly Italy is better off cooperating with the Mediterranean coalition. 
Next, consider the case where the CEECs have welcomed the West Balkan  
countries to their coalition, as presented in column six. This would increase the total 
power of the coalition by 8.9%, from 40.18% to 43.76%. The new enhanced coalition 
will  benefit  all  of  its  members,  particularly  Montenegro  by  28.4%,  and  Latvia, 
FYROM, Slovenia and Estonia by 27% each. Poland, the “leading” country of the 
CEECs block will become the most powerful nation in the EU. All other countries 
will record losses, especially Greece, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Austria at over 21% each. The smallest loses will be Germany’s at 1.8%. Note the 
jump in the decision probability when comparing to the case of no coalitions. Again it 
is normal for this coalition to be the most powerful because it has the most voting 
weights, 140 in total, and is closer to forming a blocking coalition than the rest. 
Column seven summarizes the case where the Benelux countries cooperate. As 
expected all three countries benefit from it. Luxembourg’s power increases by 9%, 
Belgium’s by 4.8%, and that of the Netherlands by 4%. The rest of the countries 
suffer minor losses. The accession of the six new countries has reduced the power of 
this coalition by 10%, from 8.60% to 7.69%. A similar situation is depicted in column 
nine,  where  the  Scandinavian  countries  form  a  ‘union’.  Sweden,  Denmark,  and 
Finland see their power rise by 3.7%, 4.8%, and 4.9% respectively, although the total 
power of the union has been decreased by the enlargement from 6.95% to 6.26%, or 
by 9.8%. 
Finally, the last column considers the case where all the coalitions take place. 
Clearly this situation is very profitable for the UK which does not belong to any of the   19
coalitions,  and  yet  witnesses  an  increase  in  its  power  by  30.3%.    This  is  a  nice 
illustration of the “paradox of new members”, which occurs in the words of Brams 
(1975) “[when] one or more players are added to a voting body and the voting power 
of at least one of the original members increases – rather than decreases or stays the 
same – in the new and larger game”. Thanks to this paradox the UK becomes the most 
powerful country in the EU. Also, as expected, gains are made by the coalition of the 
East  European  members,  especially  by  Montenegro  at  25%,  Latvia,  FYROM, 
Slovenia  and  Estonia  at  24%  each.  Although  Poland  benefits  the  least  of  all  the 
members of the CEEC coalition, by 14%, it has the chance to become the second most 
powerful nation in the Union, ahead of Germany, France, and Italy who have all more 
votes. Other countries that profit are Greece and Portugal, by 3.2% each, and Cyprus, 
and Malta, by approximately 7% each. On the other hand, Austria and Ireland are 
severely affected as their power declines by 85.8% and 79.4% respectively. For the 
rest, losses range from 27.5% for the Netherlands, to 2.5% for Spain. Obviously the 
enlargement is of great benefit
18 to the UK, by 24.3%, and the CEEC coalition, by 
4.9%. 
 
4.2 Reform Treaty 
 
  Decision-making  according  to  the  Reform  Treaty  does  not  depend  on 
weighted voting, instead each issue requires the support of 65% of EU population and 
55% of EU member states to be declared passed. Based on this, for the case of no 
coalitions the results are summarized in table 5. 
 
[insert table 5 here] 
 
As with the Nice Treaty rules the number of winning coalitions is striking, 
especially in the case of the EU33: 1,034,097,903. One cannot help noticing that the 
Reform Treaty improves significantly the ability of the EU to act which is estimated 
at 12.88% for the EU27 and 12.04% for the EU33
19. Of all the states the smallest i.e. 
Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Estonia will witness the largest loss of power in 
relative terms: 24%, 23.51%, 22.43% and 20.5% respectively, while the big four will 
                                                 
18 Comparing to the last column of table3. 
19 Remember that the respective numbers for the Nice Treaty were 2.945% and 1.94%   20
lose the least. Surprisingly, of the big four, the enlargement will affect Germany the 
most which in relative terms will lose approximately 3.34%, and Italy the least, 3%. 
These are illustrated in figure 2.  
 
[insert figure 2 here] 
 
Although  the  power  gap  between  Germany  and  France  will  close  a  little, 
Germany will continue to have about 46% more power than France, which supports 
claims  that  the  Reform  Treaty  will  breach  the  Franco-German  Alliance  for  good. 
Germany will be the most powerful nation in the Union. The gap between Germany 
and Malta, which is the least powerful nation will soar from 2082% to 2676%. The 
average loss of power will come to 11.4% in relative terms.  
 
[insert table 6 here] 
 
Now assume again that a priori unions are formed and no counter-unions take 
place.  Table  6  presents  the  results
20.  When  France  and  Germany  cooperate,  both 
countries make gains of 23.7% and 14.9% respectively, which makes them by far the 
most powerful nations. Germany is 10.3 percentage points, and France 5.4 percentage 
points ahead of the UK, the third more powerful member in the EU. Once again we 
observe the paradox of countries who do not belong to the Franco-German coalition 
profiting from it, only this time on a greater scale
21. These are mid-small countries 
with population around and below 10 million. The biggest beneficiaries are Malta by 
37.53%, Luxembourg by 36.19%, and Cyprus by 33.6%. On the other hand the UK, 
Italy,  Spain  and  Poland  lose  the  most,  24.5%,  23.8%,  15.14%,  and  14.18% 
respectively. 
Next consider the case where Italy and the Mediterranean countries form a 
‘union’. While this coalition brings gains for the two biggest countries forming it, 
11.6% for Italy and 14.5% for Spain, it reduces the power of the rest of the members 
of the coalition especially that of Malta by 89%, and Cyprus by 79.8%. Greece and 
Portugal also record losses of 6.9% and 7.7% respectively. Looking at the rest of the 
columns this phenomenon is repeated, which suggests that the Reform Treaty rules 
                                                 
20 Remember that the third column of table 6 is the same as the third column of table 5. 
21 A look at the table reveals that this paradox occurs at all other columns as well except the last.   21
may not benefit coalitions between dissimilar countries in terms of population. Other 
countries that make paradoxical profits are those with populations below or around 10 
million. Luxembourg gains almost 42%, Estonia 33%, and Latvia and Slovenia gain 
29%  each.  The  rest  of  the  states  record  losses,  with  Germany  losing  the  most  at 
14.5%. Comparing the above to the results of column eight where Italy is not involved 
in the coalition, it is clear that Italy is better off cooperating with the Mediterranean 
states. Spain is the only member of the coalition to benefit, gaining 0.5%, with the rest 
seeing significant reductions in power. Malta loses 90.4% of its power, Cyprus 82.3%, 
Portugal 19%, and Greece 18%. All other nations apart from the big four benefit, 
especially Luxembourg by 25%, Estonia by 21%, Latvia by 19.4%, and Slovenia by 
19.4%. 
Column  six  assumes a coalition between the CEECs. Again only the most 
populous members of the coalition benefit, Poland gaining 17.3% and Romania 8.9%. 
The  rest  witness  declines  in  power.  Estonia  loses  67.5%,  Slovenia  57.8%,  Latvia 
57.8%, Lithuania 39.2%, Slovakia 25%, Bulgaria 15%, Hungary 6.9%, and the Czech 
Republic 6.3%. However this coalition benefits any other country that doesn’t belong 
to it and has a population less than that of Romania. Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus 
benefit the most, gaining 58%, 60.6%, and 55% respectively. Germany records the 
biggest losses, 10%, followed by France 3.8% and the UK 3.79%.  
In the next column the Benelux countries decide to cooperate but surprisingly 
this decision leads to a reduction in the total power of the block by 19% (or over one 
percentage  point).  This  result  is  known  as  the  “paradox  of  size”  (Brams  (1975)). 
Luxembourg is affected the most as it loses 87.5% of its power. Belgium and the 
Netherlands also record losses of 15% and 5.6% respectively. With the exception of 
Germany, whose power declines marginally by 0.4%, the remaining countries profit, 
particularly Malta, 9.6%, and Cyprus, 8.7%. This suggests that the smaller the nation 
is the bigger the benefit. The same outcome can be observed in the case where the 
Scandinavian countries form a coalition. The total loss of the Scandinavian block is 
24%  (or  0.75  percentage  points).  This  translates  to  losses  of  30.95%  for  Finland, 
29.8% for Denmark, and 14.9% for Sweden.  All other EU members gain power, 
especially Malta 8.6%, Luxembourg 8.4%, and Cyprus 7.8%. 
Finally, assume that all coalitions are formed as depicted in the last column. 
The biggest beneficiaries are those who do not belong to any coalitions. Austria gains 
82%, the UK 59%, and Ireland 28%. Italy, Spain and France also profit by 1.7%,   22
1.4% and 5.6% respectively. All other countries lose. The three smallest countries 
Malta,  Cyprus,  and  Luxembourg  record  the  worst  losses  –  90%,  81%  and  87% 
respectively. The results suggest that it is better for a country not to be part of a 
coalition  unless  its  population  is  above  40.3  million.  Overall  the  table  seems  to 
suggest that coalitions are not very profitable for small countries when they cooperate 
with much larger countries. This might be the end of coalition formation as we know 
it. 
[insert table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results obtained presuming that the Western Balkans 
have acceded to the EU
22. When Germany cooperates with France it is to the benefit 
of both countries by 8.9% and 17% respectively. Again paradoxically we have power 
gains for any country with population less than that of Greece that doesn’t belong to 
the coalition, in particular for Malta 80%, Cyprus 69.6%, and Luxembourg 77%. The 
greatest losses in power are observed for the UK at 30%, Italy 29.26%, and Spain 
18.89%. It can be inferred that the enlargement has increased the losses of the UK, 
Italy and Spain by about 5 percentage points, and the benefits of Malta, Cyprus and 
Luxembourg by about 40 percentage points, while reducing the power of the Franco-
German coalition by 8.3%, from 32.36% to  29.65%. 
Now consider the case where Italy and the Mediterranean countries cooperate. 
The biggest members of the coalition Italy and Spain record gains of 12.58% and 16% 
respectively, as do any other countries that do not belong in the coalition and have 
populations below that of Portugal. Luxembourg gains the most at 38%, followed by 
Montenegro 37%, and Estonia 29%. The junior members of the coalition Malta and 
Cyprus  lose  the  greatest  proportion  of  their  power,  86%  and  74.5%  respectively. 
Portugal  loses  0.8%,  whereas  Greece  just  retains  its  non-coalitional  power.  The 
enlargement to the Western Balkans has not only reduced the block’s power from 
24.58%  to  24.01%,  or  by  2.29%,  but  has  also  reduced  the  loses  of  Portugal  and 
Greece by about 6 percentage points, and increased slightly the gains of Spain and 
Italy. Comparing the above with the situation presented in column eight where the 
coalition does not include Italy, it is once again clear that Italy is better off aligning 
with the Mediterranean coalition. As for the rest of the members, Spain, the leading 
                                                 
22 The third column in table 7 is the same as the fifth column of table5   23
member of the coalition, makes marginal gains, whereas the rest of the members lose 
even  more.  Malta  loses  87.7%  of  its  power,  Cyprus  77.8%,  Portugal  13.6%  and 
Greece  12.97%.  The  big  four  record  losses  as  well,  especially  Italy  losing  3.1%. 
Profits  are  made  by  small  countries  not  belonging  to  the  coalition,  especially  by 
Luxembourg and Montenegro, which gain about 20% each, and Estonia which gains 
16.7%. In this case the enlargement has reduced the loses of the junior members of the 
coalition by at least 3 percentage points and the gains of the small countries. It has 
also reduced the power of the coalition from 11.23% to 10.89%, or by 3%. 
  In column six the coalition of the CEECs has been joined by the countries of 
the Western Balkans. This addition has increased the power of the block from 21.46% 
to 25.70%, or by 19.74%.  It is proved to be beneficial to the four biggest members of 
the  coalition  –    Poland,  Romania,  the  Czech  Republic  and  Hungary  –  who  gain 
approximately 20.3%,  14.44%, 2.25% and 1.79% respectively in relative terms. The 
remaining  members  of  the  coalition  however  lose  power.  Most  affected  are  the 
smallest, that is Montenegro which loses 79.19%, Estonia which loses 59.53%, and 
Latvia, FYROM and Slovenia which lose 48.6% each. All other countries in the EU, 
with the exception of the four biggest and the Netherlands, record gains. This situation 
is  extremely  profitable  for  Luxembourg,  which  gains  118.4%,  Malta  123%,  and 
Cyprus 105.8%. Other countries that gain significantly are Ireland which gains 46.7%, 
Finland 35.9%, and Denmark 24%. Of the big countries Germany loses the most, 
seeing a reduction in power of 18%. So the enlargement has proved to increase the 
gains of the biggest members of the coalition and decrease the losses of the smallest. 
It has also resulted in great profits for the smallest EU countries such as Malta, and 
has reduced the losses of the UK, Italy and France, while it has increased the losses of 
Germany by 8 percentage points.  
Next, assume that the Benelux countries cooperate. Column seven reveals the 
presence of the “paradox of size” once again, with all three countries seeing a decline 
in their power – the Netherlands by 4.1%, Belgium by 11.53% and Luxembourg by 
84.6%.  All  other  countries  benefit,  except  Germany  and  Romania  who  record 
marginal losses. The enlargement sees the power of the coalition fall from 5.13% to 
4.85%, a reduction of 5.5%. Similarly in the next column where the Scandinavian 
countries  cooperate,  the  “paradox  of  size”  brings  losses  of  12.17%  for  Sweden, 
25.12% for Denmark, and 26.19% for Finland. All other countries benefit, except 
Germany  which  makes  a  marginal  loss.  The  Western  Balkan  enlargement  brings   24
about a decline of power for the Scandinavian coalition from 3.85% to 3.58% – a 
reduction of 7%.  
Finally, consider the case where all coalitions take place. The EU achieves the 
greatest  decision  probability  under  the  enlargement  at  27.34%.  This  scenario  is 
extremely profitable for the UK. Its power increases by 100%, making it the most 
powerful country in the whole of the EU, with 46% more power than Germany, which 
in every other case is the most powerful nation due to its large population. Austria 
also benefits a lot, by 36.4%. Other countries who make gains are France at 0.6%, 
Italy at 0.4%, Spain at 3.4%, and Poland at 3.6%. This is another illustration of the 
“paradox of New Members”. The rest of the countries lose. The worst affected are 
Malta which loses 87.47%, Luxembourg which loses 87.2%, Montenegro which loses 
82%,  and  Cyprus  which  loses  77%.  With  the  exception  of  Germany,  which  loses 
6.3%, it seems that the bigger a country is, the smaller the loss. Romania for example 
loses the least, 1.3%. The enlargement benefits the UK, by 41 percentage points, but 
reduces the gains of Austria, which loses 45.6 percentage points, and Ireland, which 
loses  93  percentage  points.  Finally  it  reduces  slightly  the  losses  of  the  smallest 
members Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus by at least 3 percentage points. All in all it 
looks like the results again suggest that it is more beneficial for countries not to form 
coalitions,  especially  if  they  are  small.  This  result  has  not  been  affected  by  the 




  This paper has measured the voting power of each EU member state in the 
Council of Ministers, and how this might change if the Western Balkan countries of 
Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, FYROM, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina accede 
to the Union. Particular attention has been paid to the cases where EU members form 
coalitions and cooperate with each other. Voting power has been measured using the 
Shapley-Shubik  power  index  and  its  modifications,  under  two  possible  scenarios: 
accession under the rules of the Treaty of Nice, and accession under the rules of the 
Reform Treaty. 
  The results suggest that if the West Balkan countries joined under the Nice 
Treaty  decision-making  rules  the  workability  and  efficiency  of  the  Union  would 
deteriorate, even beyond the currently low level. This offers support for claims that   25
the EU should not consider further enlargements until necessary reforms in decision-
making are made. In general, the enlargement would reduce the power of every EU 
member, although the “paradox of New Members” might occur where the power of 
some existing members is increased. Of all coalitions, that formed by the CEECs has 
the greatest voting power, and this would only be enhanced by the addition of the six 
new member states. 
  In contrast the accession of the Western Balkan countries under the Reform 
Treaty rules would not have much impact on the overall efficiency and ability of the 
Union  to  act  in  terms  of  decision-making.  Nevertheless  smaller  EU  states  would 
experience substantial losses in voting power. The results also reveal the inefficiency 
of coalition formation between countries of dissimilar size, and the likely occurrence 
of  the  “paradox  of  size”  where  some  countries  are  made  worse  off  through 
cooperation. The enlargement would not have any effect on this outcome. 
  At  present  the  timescale  for  the  possible  accession  of  the  Western  Balkan 
countries is uncertain. Nonetheless the analysis in this paper provides a clear idea of 
the likely implications of their accession, and it is important that these findings are 
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Germany  29  8.90  997  8.13  1015 
France  29  8.77  982  7.95  991 
UK  29  8.77  981  7.95  991 
Italy  29  8.74  978  7.92  986 
Spain  27  8.06  894  7.24  894 
Greece  12  3.37  315  3.04  317 
Portugal  12  3.37  315  3.04  317 
Cyprus  4  1.08  34  0.97  34 
Malta  3  0.81  0  0.73  0 
Poland  27  8.04  891  7.21  889 
Romania  14  3.96  388  3.58  390 
Czech R.  12  3.37  315  3.04  317 
Hungary  12  3.37  315  3.04  317 
Bulgaria  10  2.79  244  2.51  244 
Serbia  10  x  x  2.51  244 
Slovakia  7  1.93  138  1.74  139 
Croatia  7  x  x  1.74  139 
Bosnia&Her  7  x  x  1.74  139 
Lithuania  7  1.93  138  1.74  139 
Albania  7  x  x  1.73  137 
Latvia  4  1.09  35  0.98  35 
FYROM  4  x  x  0.98  35 
Slovenia  4  1.09  35  0.98  35   29
Estonia  4  1.09  35  0.98  35 
Montenegro  4  x  x  0.97  34 
Sweden  10  2.79  244  2.52  245 
Denmark  7  1.93  138  1.74  139 
Finland  7  1.93  138  1.74  139 
Ireland  7  1.93  138  1.74  139 
Austria  10  2.79  244  2.51  245 
Netherlands  13  3.68  354  3.31  355 
Belgium  12  3.37  315  3.04  317 
Luxembourg  4  1.08  34  0.97  34 
Decision probability:        2.95%  1.94% 
Winning coalitions  3,957,782                166,296,254 
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Table3: Voting power in the EU27 and the coalitions between member states (%) 
 













































Index         loss 
Mediterranean 
Coalition 
Index       loss 
CEECS 
Coalition 
Index       loss 
Mediterranean 
Coalition  without 
Italy 
Index         loss 
Scandinavian 
Coalition 
Index   loss 
BENELUX 
Coalition 
Index   loss 
All  
Coalitions 
Index     loss 
Germany  29  8.90  10.09  -13.41  7.91  11.14  7.86  11.64  8.70  2.20  8.89  0.08  8.90  -0.25  6.55  26.40 
France  29  8.77  10.09  -15.02  7.84  10.6  7.59  13.51  8.57  2.33  8.76  0.12  8.76  0.10  6.55  25.36 
UK   29  8.77  8.72  0.52  7.83  10.70  7.58  13.50  8.56  2.36  8.76  0.14  8.76  0.11  8.33  4.96 
Italy  29  8.74  8.72  0.19  10.53  -20.44  7.57  13.33  8.53  2.37  8.72  0.20  8.73  0.16  8.02  8.28 
Spain  27  8.06  7.94  1.44  9.80  -21.59  6.86  14.92  8.85  -9.76  8.02  0.44  8.04  0.30  7.46  7.41 
Greece  12  3.37  3.21  4.57  4.36  -29.40  2.68  20.28  3.93  -16.78  3.34  0.68  3.34  0.83  3.32  1.46 
Portugal  12  3.37  3.21  4.57  4.36  -29.40  2.68  20.28  3.93  -16.78  3.34  0.68  3.34  0.83  3.32  1.46 
Cyprus  4  1.09  1.02  6.08  1.45  -33.84  0.81  25.44  1.31  -20.83  1.09  -0.04  1.07  1.38  1.11  -1.93 
Malta  3  0.81  0.76  6.17  1.09  -34.27  0.64  21.37  0.98  -21.21  0.81  -0.42  0.81  -0.16  0.83  -2.26 
Poland  27  8.04  7.89  1.76  7.20  10.36  10.74  -33.66  7.79  3.00  7.99  0.50  8.0  0.38  10.89  -35.44 
Romania  14  3.96  3.81  3.77  3.69  6.78  5.57  -40.65  3.83  3.31  3.94  0.49  3.91  1.29  5.64  -42.53 
Czech R.  12  3.37  3.21  4.61  3.17  5.71  4.77  -41.82  3.28  2.68  3.34  0.66  3.34  0.84  4.84  -43.70 
Hungary  12  3.37  3.21  4.61  3.17  5.71  4.77  -41.82  3.28  2.68  3.34  0.66  3.34  0.84  4.84  -43.70 
Bulgaria  10  2.79  2.66  4.59  2.70  3.09  3.98  -42.82  2.72  2.20  2.77  0.67  2.77  0.61  4.03  -44.71 
Slovakia  7  1.93  1.85  4.19  1.77  8.46  2.78  -44.61  1.85  4.28  1.93  -0.06  1.91  1.31  2.82  -46.10 
Lithuania  7  1.93  1.85  4.19  1.77  8.46  2.78  -44.61  1.85  4.28  1.92  0.07  1.90  1.40  2.82  -46.53 
Latvia  4  1.09  1.04  4.44  1.01  7.28  1.59  -45.82  1.05  3.88  1.09  -0.33  1.08  1.24  1.61  -47.75 
Slovenia  4  1.09  1.04  4.44  1.01  7.28  1.59  -45.82  1.05  3.88  1.09  -0.33  1.08  1.24  1.61  -47.75 
Estonia  4  1.09  1.03  5.35  1.01  7.28  1.59  -45.82  1.05  3.88  1.09  -0.33  1.07  1.37  1.61  -47.75 
Sweden  10  2.79  2.66  4.52  2.70  3.10  2.22  20.26  2.72  2.21  2.89  -3.88  2.77  0.60  1.69  39.47 
Denmark  7  1.93  1.85  4.20  1.77  8.46  1.55  19.61  1.85  4.28  2.03  -4.90  1.91  1.31  1.18  38.87 
Finland  7  1.93  1.85  4.20  1.77  8.46  1.55  19.61  1.85  4.28  2.03  -4.90  1.91  1.31  1.18  38.87 
Ireland  7  1.93  1.85  4.20  1.77  8.35  1.54  20.06  1.85  4.23  1.93  0  1.90  1.36  0.71  62.97 
Austria  10  2.79  2.66  4.59  2.70  3.09  2.22  20.24  2.72  2.20  2.77  0.67  2.77  0.61  4.05  -45.31 
Netherlands  13  3.69  3.53  4.16  3.46  6.22  2.96  19.73  3.59  2.65  3.67  0.53  3.85  -4.60  2.24  39.17 
Belgium  12  3.37  3.21  4.61  3.17  5.71  2.68  20.27  3.28  2.68  3.34  0.66  3.56  -5.67  2.07  38.54 
Luxembourg  4  1.08  1.02  5.94  1.01  6.93  0.81  25.33  1.04  3.75  1.08  -0.06  1.19  -9.41  0.69  36.33 
Decision probability:  2.95 %          4.59%                  8.79%               12.06%                5.33%                  3.34%               3.48%               16.40%   31






































Index         loss 
Mediterranean 
Coalition 
Index        loss 
CEECS 
Coalition 
Index      loss 
BENELUX 
Coalition 




Index     loss 
Scandinavian 
Coalition 
Index     loss 
All 
Coalitions 
Index    loss 
Germany  29  8.13  9.29  -14.30  7.42  8.72  7.97  1.86  8.13  0.00  7.97  1.91  8.13  0.00  6.37  21.62 
France  29  7.95  9.29  -16.76  7.36  7.51  7.27  8.54  7.94  0.14  7.81  1.84  7.95  0.00  6.37  19.92 
UK   29  7.95  8.08  -1.65  7.35  7.51  7.27  8.56  7.94  0.15  7.80  1.83  7.94  0.08  10.36  -30.29 
Italy  29  7.92  8.08  -2.05  9.19  -16.04  7.17  9.39  7.90  0.19  7.78  1.75  7.91  0.12  7.58  4.27 
Spain  27  7.24  7.16  1.11  8.55  -18.08  6.23  13.34  7.21  0.49  7.82  -7.89  7.22  0.32  7.06  2.59 
Greece  12  3.04  2.91  4.33  3.80  -25.10  2.38  21.70  3.02  0.50  3.47  -14.30  3.03  0.33  3.14  -3.21 
Portugal  12  3.04  2.91  4.38  3.80  -25.14  2.38  21.68  3.02  0.51  3.47  -14.33  3.03  0.34  3.14  -3.24 
Cyprus  4  0.97  0.91  6.15  1.27  -30.02  0.85  12.63  0.96  1.16  1.16  -18.80  0.97  0.00  1.05  -7.26 
Malta  3  0.73  0.68  6.46  0.95  -30.37  0.64  12.63  0.73  0.53  0.87  -19.10  0.73  0.00  0.78  -7.54 
Poland  27  7.21  7.06  2.05  6.75  6.36  8.44  -17.05  7.17  0.58  7.05  2.27  7.19  0.36  8.24  -14.31 
Romania  14  3.58  3.44  3.80  3.42  4.23  4.38  -22.39  3.55  0.71  3.51  1.97  3.56  0.32  4.27  -19.52 
Czech R.  12  3.04  2.90  4.39  2.86  5.84  3.75  -23.52  3.02  0.51  2.96  2.49  3.03  0.35  3.66  -20.63 
Hungary  12  3.04  2.90  4.39  2.86  5.81  3.75  -23.59  3.02  0.53  2.96  2.49  3.02  0.37  3.66  -20.69 
Bulgaria  10  2.51  2.39  4.75  2.40  4.55  3.13  -24.56  2.50  0.39  2.46  2.04  2.50  0.47  3.05  -21.64 
Serbia  10  2.51  2.39  4.75  2.40  4.55  3.13  -24.56  2.50  0.39  2.46  2.04  2.50  0.47  3.05  -21.64 
Slovakia  7  1.74  1.66  4.96  1.66  4.75  2.19  -25.60  1.74  0.41  1.71  2.10  1.73    0.49  2.14  -22.66 
Croatia  7  1.74  1.65  5.14  1.66  4.69  2.19  -25.85  1.73  0.47  1.70  2.08  1.73  0.48  2.14  -22.91 
Bosnia&Her.  7  1.74  1.64  5.31  1.66  4.72  2.19  -26.00  1.73  0.50  1.70  2.11  1.73  0.50  2.14  -23.04 
Lithuania  7  1.74  1.64  5.37  1.66  4.71  2.19  -26.12  1.73  0.50  1.70  2.14  1.73  0.52  2.14  -23.16 
Albania  7  1.73  1.64  5.51  1.66  4.71  2.19  -26.22  1.72  0.52  1.70  2.13  1.72  0.52  2.14  -23.26 
Latvia  4  0.98  0.93  5.28  0.94  4.49  1.25  -27.48  0.97  1.04  0.96  2.32  0.98  0.00  1.22  -24.49 
FYROM  4  0.98  0.93  5.28  0.94  4.49  1.25  -27.48  0.97  1.04  0.96  2.32  0.98  0.00  1.22  -24.49 
Slovenia  4  0.98  0.93  5.28  0.94  4.49  1.25  -27.48  0.97  1.04  0.96  2.32  0.98  0.00  1.22  -24.49 
Estonia  4  0.98  0.92  5.65  0.93  4.48  1.25  -27.91  0.97  1.08  0.95  2.32  0.97  0.50  1.22  -24.91 
Montenegro  4  0.97  0.91  6.21  0.93  4.47  1.25  -28.41  0.96  1.16  0.95  2.28  0.97  0.00  1.22  -25.40 
Sweden  10  2.52  2.40  4.52  2.40  4.59  1.98  21.28  2.51  0.34  2.46  2.01  2.61  -3.76  2.23  11.26 
Denmark  7  1.74  1.66  4.96  1.66  4.75  1.43  18.18  1.74  0.41  1.71  2.10  1.83  -4.87  1.56  10.32 
Finland  7  1.74  1.65  5.00  1.66  4.75  1.42  18.35  1.73  0.42  1.71  2.10  1.83  -4.9  1.56  10.29 
Ireland  7  1.74  1.64  5.31  1.65  4.72  1.40  19.17  1.73  0.50  1.70  2.11  1.73  0.50  0.36  79.44 
Austria  10  2.51  2.40  4.57  2.40  4.54  1.96  21.99  2.50  0.36  2.46  2.03  2.50  0.42  0.36  85.79 
Netherlands  13  3.31  3.18  3.91  3.12  5.97  2.60  21.44  3.45  -4.04  3.23  2.58  3.30  0.40  2.40  27.54 
Belgium  12  3.04  2.90  4.38  2.86  5.84  2.38  21.66  3.18  -4.80  2.96  2.49  3.03  0.35  2.22  27.01 
Luxembourg  4  0.97  0.91  6.35  0.93  4.47  0.85  13.00  1.06  -9.00  0.95  2.28  0.97  0.00  0.74  24.08 





















Germany  82.4  16.21    2082     15.66  2676 
France  60.7  11.10   1393  10.74  1802 
UK   60.4  11.03   1384  10.67  1792 
Italy  58.1  10.55  1320  10.22  1712 
Spain  40.3  7.13    860  6.89  1120 
Greece  11.0  2.40    223  2.18  286 
Portugal  10.6  2.33  214  2.12  275 
Cyprus  0.8  0.80    8  0.62  11 
Malta  0.4  0.74    0  0.56  0 
Poland  38.6  6.85    822  6.61  1071 
Romania  22.3  4.26    474  4.02  612 
Czech R.  10.2  2.27    205  2.06  264 
Hungary  10.0  2.24    201  2.02  259 
Bulgaria  7.5  1.84  148  1.64  190 
Serbia  7.5  x  x  1.64  190 
Slovakia  5.4  1.51  103  1.32  133 
Croatia  4.4  x  x  1.16  106 
Bosnia&Her  4.0  x  x  1.10  96 
Lithuania  3.6  1.23    66  1.04  85 
Albania  3.2  x  x  0.98  74 
Latvia  2.0  0.99    33  0.80  42 
Slovenia  2.0  0.99    33  0.80  42 
FYROM  2.0  x  x  0.80  42 
Estonia  1.4  0.90    21  0.71  26 
Montenegro  0.4  x    x  0.59  5 
Sweden  9.0  2.08    180  1.87  231 
Denmark  5.4  1.51  103  1.32  133 
Finland  5.2  1.48    99  1.28  128 
Ireland  4.0  1.30  75  1.10  96 
Austria  8.2  1.95    163  1.75  209 
Netherlands  16.4  3.27  340  3.04  438 
Belgium  10.4  2.30  210  2.09  270 
Luxembourg  0.5  0.76    2  0.58  3 
Decision probability:  12.88%  12.04% 
Winning coalitions:  17,293,669  1,034,097,903 
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Index         loss 
Mediterranean 
Coalition 
Index       loss 
CEECs  
Coalition 
Index        loss 
BENELUX 
Coalition 




Index           loss 
Scandinavian 
Coalition 
Index         loss 
All Coalitions 
 
Index       loss 
Germany  82.4  16.21  18.64  -14.98  13.84  14.59  14.43  10.99  16.14  0.42  15.78  2.64  16.22  -0.07  15.90  1.88 
France  60.7  11.09  13.73  -23.79  10.53  5.08  10.67  3.83  11.11  -0.20  10.72  3.30  11.12  -0.27  11.72  -5.63 
UK   60.4  11.03  8.32  24.58  10.49  4.85  10.61  3.80  11.05  -0.22  10.66  3.30  11.60  -0.30  17.62  -59.79 
Italy  58.1  10.55  8.03  23.85  11.78  -11.68  10.15  3.74  10.58  -0.25  10.18  3.48  10.58  -0.33  10.73  -1.70 
Spain  40.3  7.13  6.05  15.14  8.17  -14.56  7.08  0.77  7.22  -1.24  7.17  -0.53  7.20  -0.86  7.44  -4.33 
Greece  11.0  2.40  2.40  0.00  2.23  6.95  2.80  -16.95  2.44  -1.80  1.96  18.35  2.45  -2.28  2.03  15.27 
Portugal  10.6  2.33  2.33  0.00  2.15  7.79  2.74  -17.42  2.38  -1.95  1.89  19.09  2.39  -2.42  1.96  16.03 
Cyprus  0.8  0.80  1.08  -33.62  0.16  79.83  1.25  -55.16  0.87  -8.73  0.14  82.31  0.87  -7.85  0.15  81.63 
Malta  0.4  0.74  1.02  -37.53  0.08  89.08  1.19  -60.69  0.81  -9.61  0.07  90.42  0.81  -8.68  0.07  90.06 
Poland  38.6  6.85  5.88  14.18  6.46  5.69  8.04  -17.38  6.94  -1.30  6.94  -1.32  6.91  -0.84  6.60  3.63 
Romania  22.3  4.26  4.00  6.09  4.22  0.97  4.65  -9.00  4.29  -0.61  4.61  -8.14  4.29  -0.63  3.81  10.51 
Czech R.  10.2  2.27  2.28  -0.48  2.40  -5.61  2.13  6.32  2.32  -2.06  2.48  -9.27  2.32  -2.47  1.75  23.09 
Hungary  10.0  2.24  2.25  -0.63  2.37  -5.77  2.08  6.93  2.29  -2.16  2.45  -9.36  2.30  -2.55  1.71  23.59 
Bulgaria  7.5  1.84  1.94  -5.18  2.02  -9.93  1.56  15.07  1.89  -2.84  2.04  -10.87  1.90  -2.96  1.28  30.27 
Slovakia  5.4  1.51  1.66  -9.75  1.73  -14.74  1.13  25.55  1.57  -3.94  1.71  -13.33  1.56  -3.12  0.92  38.87 
Lithuania  3.6  1.23  1.42  -15.02  1.49  -20.92  0.75  39.23  1.30  -5.15  1.43  -16.26  1.29  -4.55  0.62  50.11 
Latvia  2.0  0.99  1.23  -23.99  1.28  -29.66  0.42  57.86  1.05  -6.66  1.18  -19.43  1.05  -6.22  0.34  65.39 
Slovenia  2.0  0.99  1.23  -23.99  1.28  -29.66  0.42  57.86  1.05  -6.66  1.18  -19.43  1.05  -6.22  0.34  65.39 
Estonia  1.4  0.90  1.15  -28.10  1.20  -33.55  0.29  67.51  0.96  -7.50  1.09  -21.65  0.96  -7.26  0.24  73.33 
Sweden  9.0  2.08  2.12  -2.27  2.22  -7.02  2.50  -20.25  2.13  -2.35  2.29  -10.05  1.77  14.91  1.97  5.23 
Denmark  5.4  1.51  1.66  -9.75  1.73  -14.74  1.85  -22.59  1.57  -3.94  1.71  -13.33  1.06  29.85  1.18  21.86 
Finland  5.2  1.48  1.63  -10.47  1.70  -14.87  1.82  -23.04  1.54  -4.09  1.68  -13.43  1.02  30.95  1.13  23.10 
Ireland  4.0  1.30  1.47  -13.36  1.54  -19.06  1.70  -30.97  1.36  -4.94  1.50  -15.23  1.35  -4.00  1.67  -28.53 
Austria  8.2  1.95  2.03  -3.80  2.12  -8.54  2.40  -22.86  2.00  -2.67  2.16  -10.66  2.00  -2.84  3.57  -82.98 
Netherlands  16.4  3.27  3.14  4.01  3.29  -0.79  3.46  -5.93  3.08  5.65  3.52  -7.68  3.30  -1.13  3.15  3.66 
Belgium  10.4  2.30  2.30  -0.14  2.42  -5.28  2.70  -17.55  1.95  15.02  2.51  -9.10  2.36  -2.50  2.00  13.23 
Luxembourg  0.5  0.76  1.03  -36.20  1.07  -41.93  1.20  -58.08  0.09  87.59  0.95  -25.47  0.82  -8.43  0.10  87.33 
Decision probability:             12.89%  17.78%  16.63%  16.77%  13.15%  13.52%  13.12%  26.56%   34
Table 7: Power in the EU33 and coalitions between members (%) 
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Index          loss 
Mediterranean 
Coalition 
Index         loss 
CEECS 
Coalition 
Index         loss 
BENELUX 
Coalition 




Index            loss 
Scandinavian 
Coalition 
Index        loss 
All 
Coalitions 
Index         loss 
Germany  82.4     15.66  17.07  -8.99  13.38  14.59  12.73  18.75  15.62  0.27  15.21  2.93  15.66  0.01  14.67  6.35 
France  60.7  10.74  12.58  -17.16  10.18  5.21  10.39  3.24  10.74  -0.01  10.41  3.01  10.75  -0.13  10.81  -0.67 
UK   60.4  10.67  7.46  30.13  10.14  5.00  10.35  3.03  10.68  -0.03  10.35  3.02  10.69  -0.14  21.43  -100.7 
Italy  58.1  10.22  7.23  29.27  11.51  -12.58  10.10  1.21  10.23  -0.08  9.90  3.13  10.25  -0.20  10.27  -0.46 
Spain  40.3  6.89  5.59  18.90  7.98  -15.95  7.68  -11.49  6.95  -0.86  6.95  -0.97  6.93  -0.60  7.13  -3.47 
Greece  11.0  2.18  2.18  0.27  2.18  0.07  2.35  -7.68  2.21  -1.17  1.90  12.98  2.21  -1.22  1.95  10.83 
Portugal  10.6  2.12  2.13  -0.55  2.10  0.82  2.31  -9.21  2.14  -1.25  1.83  13.63  2.14  -1.25  1.87  11.49 
Cyprus  0.8  0.62  1.06  -69.64  0.16  74.59  1.28  -105.8  0.66  -6.56  0.14  77.88  0.66  -6.20  0.14  77.33 
Malta  0.4  0.56  1.02  -80.10  0.08  85.96  1.26  -123.1  0.61  -7.28  0.07  87.78  0.60  -6.89  0.07  87.47 
Poland  38.6  6.61  5.45  17.62  6.06  8.29  7.95  -20.33  6.67  -0.94  6.61  -0.05  6.65  -0.66  6.85  -3.69 
Romania  22.3  4.02  3.54  11.74  3.83  4.61  4.60  -14.44  3.99  0.55  4.23  -5.41  4.02  -0.08  3.96  1.39 
Czech R.  10.2  2.06  2.08  -1.36  2.09  -1.45  2.10  -2.26  2.08  -1.30  2.18  -6.06  2.10  -1.29  1.81  11.89 
Hungary  10.0  2.02  2.06  -1.83  2.06  -1.64  2.06  -1.79  2.05  -1.35  2.15  -6.12  2.06  -1.34  1.78  12.29 
Bulgaria  7.5  1.64  1.78  -8.65  1.72  -4.92  1.55  5.59  1.67  -1.91  1.76  -7.37  1.67  -1.89  1.33  18.65 
Serbia  7.5  1.64  1.78  -8.65  1.72  -4.92  1.55  5.59  1.67  -1.91  1.76  -7.37  1.67  -1.89  1.33  18.65 
Slovakia  5.4  1.32  1.55  -17.81  1.44  -9.38  1.11  15.45  1.35  -2.54  1.43  -9.03  1.35  -2.59  0.96  27.14 
Croatia  4.4  1.16  1.44  -23.84  1.31  -12.41  0.91  22.10  1.20  -3.02  1.28  -10.15  1.20  -2.90  0.78  32.88 
Bosnia&Her.  4.0  1.10  1.40  -26.78  1.26  -13.84  0.82  25.32  1.14  -3.24  1.22  -10.74  1.14  -3.08  0.71  35.65 
Lithuania  3.6  1.04  1.36  -30.00  1.21  -15.52  0.74  28.90  1.08  -3.48  1.16  -11.42  1.08  -3.32  0.64  38.73 
Albania  3.2  0.98  1.31  -33.67  1.15  -17.19  0.66  32.93  1.02  -3.74  1.10  -12.06  1.02  -3.61  0.57  42.21 
Latvia  2.0  0.80  1.18  -47.48  1.00  -24.19  0.41  48.66  0.84  -4.82  0.92  -14.80  0.84  -4.61  0.36  55.76 
FYROM  2.0  0.80  1.18  -47.48  1.00  -24.19  0.41  48.66  0.84  -4.82  0.92  -14.80  0.84  -4.61  0.36  55.76 
Slovenia  2.0  0.80  1.18  -47.48  1.00  -24.19  0.41  48.66  0.84  -4.82  0.92  -14.80  0.84  -4.61  0.36  55.76 
Estonia  1.4  0.71  1.12  -57.17  0.92  -29.00  0.29  59.54  0.75  -5.55  0.83  -16.76  0.75  -5.34  0.25  65.15 
Montenegro  0.6  0.59  1.04  -74.60  0.82  -37.66  0.12  79.19  0.64  -6.94  0.71  -20.13  0.63  -6.52  0.11  82.07 
Sweden  9.0  1.87  1.95  -4.29  1.93  -2.94  2.15  -15.18  1.90  -1.54  1.99  -6.50  1.64  12.17  1.09  41.54 
Denmark  5.4  1.32  1.55  -17.81  1.44  -9.38  1.76  -34.09  1.35  -2.54  1.43  -9.03  0.99  25.13  0.66  50.23 
Finland  5.2  1.29  1.53  -18.96  1.41  -9.87  1.75  -35.93  1.32  -2.62  1.40  -9.23  0.95  26.20  0.63  50.91 
Ireland  4.0  1.10  1.40  -26.78  1.26  -13.84  1.62  -46.71  1.14  -3.24  1.22  -10.74  1.14  -3.08  0.71  35.28 
Austria  8.2  1.75  1.86  -6.50  1.81  -3.90  2.06  -17.79  1.78  -1.76  1.87  -6.96  1.78  -1.70  2.38  -36.41 
Netherlands  16.4  3.04  2.81  7.37  2.96  2.38  2.95  2.80  2.91  4.15  3.20  -5.39  3.06  -0.79  2.43  19.94 
Belgium  10.4  2.09  2.11  -0.95  2.11  -1.28  2.30  -10.04  1.85  11.53  2.21  -6.05  2.11  -1.27  1.54  26.10 
Luxembourg  0.5  0.58  1.03  -77.31  0.80  -39.00  1.26  -118.4  0.09  84.68  0.70  -20.62  0.62  -6.72  0.07  87.20 
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Appendix II 
 
Sometimes, especially when considering double majority systems such as the Reform 
Treaty rules, the voting power estimates obtained by SSI and the Banzhaf (BNZ) power indices 
can vary considerably. This is illustrated in the following two tables. Using IOP the following 
results were obtained for the EU27: 
 
A) Under the Reform Treaty Rules and assuming no a priori coalitions table 8 reveals 
that in comparison to the SSI, the BNZ power index systematically underestimates the voting 
power of the bigger EU states whereas it overestimates the voting power of the smaller states. 
 














Germany  82.4  16.21      11.77  4.44 
France  60.7  11.10     8.83  2.27 
UK   60.4  11.03     8.79  2.24 
Italy  58.1  10.55    8.50  2.05 
Spain  40.3  7.13      6.18  0.95 
Greece  11.0  2.40      2.87  -0.47 
Portugal  10.6  2.33    2.82  -0.49 
Cyprus  0.8  0.80    1.63  -0.83 
Malta  0.4  0.74    1.59  -0.85 
Poland  38.6  6.85     5.93  0.92 
Romania  22.3  4.26     4.25  0.01 
Czech R.  10.2  2.27      2.77  -0.5 
Hungary  10.0  2.24     2.75  -0.51 
Bulgaria  7.5  1.84  2.45  -0.61 
Slovakia  5.4  1.51  2.19  -0.68 
Lithuania  3.6  1.23    1.97  -0.74 
Latvia  2.0  0.99    1.78  -0.79 
Slovenia  2.0  0.99    1.78  -0.79 
Estonia  1.4  0.90    1.71  -0.81 
Sweden  9.0  2.08    2.63  -0.55 
Denmark  5.4  1.51  2.19  -0.68 
Finland  5.2  1.48    2.17  -0.69 
Ireland  4.0  1.30  2.02  -0.72 
Austria  8.2  1.95    2.53  -0.58 
Netherlands  16.4  3.27  3.52  -0.25 
Belgium  10.4  2.30  2.80  -0.5 
Luxembourg  0.5  0.76    1.60  -0.84 
 
 
B) Under the Nice Treaty Rules and assuming no a priori coalitions table 9 reveals that 
in  comparison  to  the  SSI,  the  BNZ  power  index  (although  to  a  much  lesser  extent  when   38
compared to the above case) underestimates the voting power of the bigger EU states whereas 
it overestimates the voting power of the smaller states.  
 
















Germany  29  8.90  7.91  0.99 
France  29  8.77  7.91  0.86 
UK  29  8.77  7.91  0.86 
Italy  29  8.74  7.91  0.83 
Spain  27  8.06  7.51  0.55 
Greece  12  3.37  3.64  -0.27 
Portugal  12  3.37  3.64  -0.27 
Cyprus  4  1.08  1.24  -0.16 
Malta  3  0.81  0.92  -0.11 
Poland  27  8.04  7.51  0.53 
Romania  14  3.96  4.22  -0.26 
Czech R.  12  3.37  3.64  -0.27 
Hungary  12  3.37  3.64  -0.27 
Bulgaria  10  2.79  3.05  -0.26 
Slovakia  7  1.93  2.15  -0.22 
Lithuania  7  1.93  2.15  -0.22 
Latvia  4  1.09  1.24  -0.15 
Slovenia  4  1.09  1.24  -0.15 
Estonia  4  1.09  1.24  -0.15 
Sweden  10  2.79  3.05  -0.26 
Denmark  7  1.93  2.15  -0.22 
Finland  7  1.93  2.15  -0.22 
Ireland  7  1.93  2.15  -0.22 
Austria  10  2.79  3.05  -0.26 
Netherlands  13  3.68  3.93  -0.25 
Belgium  12  3.37  3.64  -0.27 
Luxembourg  4  1.08  1.24  -0.16 